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Abstract—Emerging Internet of Thing (IoT) platforms provide
a convenient solution for integrating heterogeneous IoT devices
and deploying home automation applications. However, serious
privacy threats arise as device data now flow out to the IoT
platforms, which may be subject to various attacks. We observe
two privacy-unfriendly practices in emerging home automation
systems: first, the majority of data flowed to the platform are
superfluous in the sense that they do not trigger any home
automation; second, home owners currently have nearly zero
control over their data.
We present PFIREWALL, a customizable data-flow control
system to enhance user privacy. PFIREWALL analyzes the au-
tomation apps to extract their semantics, which are automatically
transformed into data-minimization policies; these policies only
send minimized data flows to the platform for app execution, such
that the ability of attackers to infer user privacy is significantly
impaired. In addition, PFIREWALL provides capabilities and
interfaces for users to define and enforce customizable policies
based on individual privacy preferences. PFIREWALL adopts an
elegant man-in-the-middle design, transparently executing data-
minimization and user-defined policies to process raw data flows
and mediating the processed data between IoT devices and the
platform (via the hub), without requiring modifications of the
platform or IoT devices. We implement PFIREWALL to work
with two popular platforms: SmartThings and openHAB, and
set up two real-world testbeds to evaluate its performance. The
evaluation results show that PFIREWALL is very effective: it
reduces IoT data sent to the platform by 97% and enforces user-
defined policies successfully.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the prosperity of Internet of Things (IoTs), smart sys-
tems (e.g., smart homes, factories, and hospitals) have become
realistic and are expanding with an ever-increasing speed [1].
IoT Platforms, such as SmartThings, Wink, openHAB, allow
smart home users to connect heterogeneous IoT devices (e.g.,
sensors, actuators, appliances) to a platform-provided hub and
to install applications on the platform to create automatic
interactions among devices, i.e., home automation.
As IoT device data flow to the platform, protecting user
privacy becomes critical [2], [3]. Existing work protects user
privacy by resolving threats caused by malicios automation
applications [4], [5], [6], [7] or handling attacks that eavesdrop
IoT device traffic [8], [9], [10], [11]. Surprisingly, none inves-
tigates privacy protection at the platform architectural level,
even though the platform receives huge amounts of data from
An earlier version of this paper was submitted to USENIX Security on
November 15th, 2018. This version contains some minor modifications based
on that submission.
smart homes and has full data access privileges. Indeed, it is
baseless to assume the platform is secure and trustworthy. A
platform could be compromised by both inside attackers [12]
and remote attackers that exploit the vulnerabilities of its hub
and cloud [13]. Compared to clouds that have suffered many
notorious attacks, an IoT platform has a much larger attack
surface involving not only its cloud but also the hub and user
control interfaces (e.g., web and mobile app). Moreover, many
IoT platforms share users’ data with partners (e.g., advertisers)
for the expansion of businesses [14], [15], [16]; any improper
protection may exfiltrate private data to third parties.
Our investigation of popular smart home platforms shows
that these platforms are factually overprivileged to access real-
time data streams from connected devices, although most of
the data do not trigger any automation. This deviates the
principle of “data minimisation” in European General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) [17] or “least privilege” in ac-
cess control systems [18]. We also find that no capabilities are
provided for users to control the leakage of private device data
to the platform, failing to realize user-centric authorization.
Therefore, our goals are to minimize the data sent to the
platform and allow users to define customizable data flow
control policies for individual privacy preferences.
Multiple challenges arise for attaining these goals. First, the
data minimization should not adversely affect the functionality
of home automation . We observe that the semantics of
home automation apps can be represented as rules with each
following a event-condition-action model and the state-of-
art code analysis techniques [19], [20], [7] are proved to be
effective in extracting rule semantics from apps. Our insight
is that by finding the minimum data flows required by these
rule semantics, we can properly generate and enforce data
flow control policies without affecting home automation. For
example, suppose a rule has a semantic “when a motion is
detected, if the indoor temperature is higher than 79◦F , turn
on the A/C”. We can convert it into a data-minimization policy,
such that if the indoor temperature is not higher than 79◦F , no
data is sent to the platform; besides, if the A/C is already on
(that is, the rule execution does not change anything), no data
is sent even if the temperature is higher than 79◦F . Optionally,
users can have the system fuzz the data, such that even if the
policy execution determines that the temperature should be
sent, a random value larger than 79 is reported.
Second, many platforms are closed systems that do not al-
low platform-level modifications and it is probably unrealistic
to expect a platform to cooperate to enforce data minimization.
Thus, how to enforce data-protection policies before data leave
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the home network is a challenge. Intuitively, one may propose
to circumvent this challenge by building a new purely-local
platform, such that no data have to flow out of a home; or, one
can simply cut the network cable of a local gateway [21] and
enforce most of the home automation locally. However, a large
number of existing platforms have been deployed in homes and
it might be infeasible to convince users to switch to another
new platform they are not familiar with; moreover, a purely
local platform means that a lot of highly desired Internet-based
services (e.g., messaging, storage, and remote management)
will be cut out. Therefore, how to enforce data protection on
the existing platform architecture without sacrificing the values
of Internet-based services imposes extra difficulties.
We leverage multiple system-building ideas into our sys-
tem, named PFIREWALL. First, we build PFIREWALL as a
data mediator, which sits between IoT devices and the hub to
transparently filter data based on privacy-protection policies.
The advantage is that neither IoT devices nor the platform
needs to be modified. Thus, another challenge is that the
original communication between IoT devices and the hub is
encrypted, which prevents PFIREWALL from understanding
and then filtering data. We overcome this difficulty with a
man-in-the-middle approach: the data mediator claims itself
as a hub to pair with all the devices, and meanwhile it creates
the same number of virtual devices to connect the hub.
Furthermore, we borrow the idea of a DMZ (demilitarized
zone) when designing PFIREWALL. A DMZ exposes certain
external-facing services (e.g., web) to the Internet, while the
organization’s local area network (LAN) is segregated by a
firewall. This way, even a node in the DMZ is compromised,
attackers need to bypass the firewall to reach the LAN.
We propose to place the hub in a DMZ, and set up an
extremely simple firewall between the DMZ and PFIREWALL:
the external world cannot initiate connection to PFIREWALL,
and any inbound traffic, unless it targets those virtual devices,
should be discarded immediately by PFIREWALL.
We demonstrate the ideas by implementing PFIREWALL to
work with two representative platforms: Samsung SmartThings
and openHAB, which are of the most popular cloud-based
and gateway-based IoT platforms, respectively. We evaluate
PFIREWALL in two real-world deployments. The results sug-
gest that PFIREWALL reduces the amount of data sent to
the platform by 97% based on data-minimization policies.
Our case study shows that the data reduction heavily impairs
the attacker’s ability to infer privacy-sensitive behaviors, e.g.,
bathroom usage and the arrival and departure time of home
members. The user-specified policies provides extra fine-
grained data control to resolve personalized privacy prefer-
ences and concerns.
The contributions of this work are summarized as follows.
• We reveal the fact that most smart home platforms employ
a simple trust-by-default model between home devices and
the platforms, resulting in over-leakage of sensitive IoT
device data. We find several channels through which the
collected data could be revealed, demonstrating the severe
privacy risks. Despite the clear need for user-centric data
flow control, we find that most leading platforms do not
have supports for this purpose.
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Fig. 1: Smart home platform architecture.
• We design an effective data flow control system to enhance
user privacy in home automation. On one hand, data-
minimization policies are automatically generated based on
the installed automation apps, reporting minimally neces-
sary data for app execution and obfuscating the reported
data for further protection. On the other, users are offered
capabilities to prioritize policies specified by themselves to
customize data flow control for individual privacy prefer-
ences and concerns.
• A man-in-the-middle style enforcement mechanism in
closed-source smart home systems is designed. A proxy
device mediates the communication between IoT devices
and the hub, without modifying the devices or the hub.
• We implement a proof-of-concept prototype to work with
two platforms: SmartThings and openHAB. Through the
evaluation in two real-world scenarios: a two-bedroom
apartment and a public workplace, we demonstrate that
our system significantly reduces the privacy risks due to
data leakage and introduces negligible latency to home
automation. A user study is conducted to learn users’
attitude and capabilities towards defining privacy-protection
policies with mobile interfaces.
II. BACKGROUND: SMART HOME PLATFORMS
Smart home platforms can be categorized into two types:
cloud-based platforms (CBPs) and gateway/hub-based plat-
forms (GBPs), according to whether the core framework of a
platform is hosted in a remote cloud or a gateway/hub device
located at home (as shown in Fig. 1); the two types are similar,
otherwise. Note that the gateway running a core framework
at home does not resolve the privacy leakage threats, as the
gateway connects to the Internet and is under the full control of
the platform administrator. Once the platform is compromised,
the attacker gains equivalent capabilities of gaining user data.
We choose a CBP—SmartThings, one of the most popular
and full-fledged platforms, as an example to describe the key
components in a smart home system.
• Hub. A CBP hub connects IoT devices through distinct
short/medium-range wireless radios (ZigBee, Z-Wave, etc.).
The hub plays a key role to ensure the interconnectivity and
interoperability of heterogeneous IoT devices. A GBP also
has a hub-like device1 which not only connects IoT devices
but also hosts the core framework (descrbied below). Note
that the hub or gateway device, though physically located at
home, is conceptually regarded as a part of the platform in
terms of data privacy protection in that it is under the fully
control of the platform administrator.
1We use gateway for distinguishment.
• Cloud. The backend cloud of a CBP hosts the core frame-
work and provides cloud messaging, storage as well as
any other necessary services for the platform to function.
The cloud in a GBP is typically responsible for messaging
and storage. The cloud messaging service facilitates some
critical functionalities, such as notification, third-party ap-
plication integration, remote monitoring and control. Many
Internet-based services depend on the cloud.
• Core Framework. The core framework runs major func-
tionalities of a platform, including home automation. Take
SmartThings as an example. It provides a sandboxed run-
time environment for running device handlers and Smar-
tApps. Device handlers are software wrappers of physical
devices which abstract the physical devices (as a set of
capabilities and handle the underlying protocol-specific
communications between the core framework and the physi-
cal devices). They expose uniform interfaces for SmartApps
to interact with devices.
• Companion and Third-Party Apps. To provide a conve-
nient user interface (UI) for users to manage their hubs, IoT
devices and apps, a platform usually provides a smartphone
companion app. For instance, in SmartThings companion
app, users can install and configure a SmartApp. Current
platforms also expose interfaces (mostly RESTful cloud
APIs) to incorporate third-party services/applications (e.g.,
mobile apps, IFTTT [22], webCoRE [23]).
Therefore, a smart home platform has a large attack surface
involving the hub, cloud, core framework services, companion
app, and APIs for third parties, let alone inside attacks. It is
dangerous and unnecessary that users grant unlimited trust to
it by allowing all the data to flow to the platform.
III. MOTIVATION AND THREAT MODEL
In this section, we first reveal two facts we have observed,
and then present the threat model.
A. Privacy Concerns about Platforms
1) Trust By Default: In smart home systems, the platforms
are typically fully trusted. That said, after being installed,
a platform gains the access privilege to all connected home
devices technically by design and legally by claiming a terms
and conditions or a privacy policy. To reduce development
complexity and the time to market, most emerging platforms
do not provide access control between home devices and their
hubs to avoid accessing unnecessary data; instead, they simply
collect all data streams reported by devices for further process-
ing. We studied the privacy-related practices in popular smart
home platforms and showed the details in Appendix A. In this
section we use SmartThings as an exemplar to demonstrate.
Are home data flowing out of homes silently? To answer
this question, we connected four types of ZigBee devices (a
multipurpose sensor, a motion sensor, an arrival sensor and
an outlet) and a Z-Wave sensor (Aeotec Multisensor 6) to
a SmartThings hub and inserted log.debug code into the
parse methods of device handlers which are used by
the core framework to parse the received IoT payload and
generate in-system events. In this way, we obtain all data
received by the SmartThings cloud via its hub on the living
logging interface [24]. We did not install any automation apps
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Fig. 2: The architecture of PFIREWALL.
and did not operate any SmartThings-provided interfaces; we
only interacted with the devices physically. We found that the
platform cloud still kept receiving device attribute data (e.g.,
motion, switch, temperature, etc.) from the above devices,
indicating that device data flow out via the hub even if they
are not subscribed to or requested by any service.
This trust-by-default model introduces severe data leakage
risks to smart homes since attackers may gain unauthorized
access to home data by compromising the hub device, cloud
infrastructure, or the companion app [25]. Vulnerabilities in
IoT platforms and clouds have been demonstrated by recent
works. For instance, Fernandes et al. [18] and Zuo et al. [26]
respectively revealed that the abuse of OAuth tokens and cloud
API tokens in mobile apps imposes significant security and
privacy threats including unauthorized access to the platform.
An inside attacker can also access all the data.
2) Limited User Capabilities: Users visibility and control
helps mitigate risks. However, users have few capabilities and
interfaces to inspect or control what their device sends to the
Internet [25]. They only have a binary choice: whether or
not to connect a device to the platform; once connected, the
device keeps reporting data to the hub device continuously and
opaquely.
B. Threat Model
We consider the platform may be exploited by attackers for
accessing user private data and inferring user privacy-sensitive
behaviors. Attacks that exploit the home IoT device hardware
vulnerabilities, side channels, or home local networks to steal
private data are out of the scope of this work. We assume
the home automation apps are not malicious (note that how
to detect and handle malicious automation apps is a separate
problem and has been well studied, e.g. [7], [20], [22]).
IV. PFIREWALL SYSTEM OVERVIEW
To mitigate data leakage, we propose to introduce access
control before data leave the control of users. In this way,
privacy-oriented metrics can be applied to provide the data
exposure with certain privacy guarantees (i.e., data minimiza-
tion in this paper) and end-user controls are also feasible to
satisfy personal privacy preferences. However, it is challenging
to attain these goals for the following reasons. First, the
data filtering, if not carefully performed, may accidentally
affect home automation. Thus, how to precisely analyze apps
and convert them into privacy-protection policies correctly is
a challenge (Section V-A). Most smart home platforms are
closed-systems and do not allow platform-level modifications.
Moreover, the traffic between IoT devices and the hub is
encrypted. How to perform the data filtering without modi-
fying the device, hub, or platform framework is challenging
(Section V-B). How to provide interfaces for non-expert users
to define their own privacy-protection policies is non-trivial
(Section V-A2).
For interoperability, the wireless protocols in IoT devices
are mostly open-source standard ones such as ZigBee, Z-
Wave, LAN, etc., which makes it possible to place a man-
in-the-middle device (named mediator) between IoT devices
and the hub to intervene in the communication between them.
On top of the mediator, it becomes possible to process the
raw data flows before forwarding them to the hub. With this
insight, we build PFIREWALL, a system that enforces carefully
generated data flow control policies before data are reported
to the backend platform for home automation. As shown in
Fig. 2, PFIREWALL comprises the following modules:
• Rule extractor extracts the home automation rules from
rule creation interfaces, e.g., IoT apps, webpages, smart-
phone apps, etc. When rules are initially installed, the rule
extractor obtains rule semantics and rule-device binding
information. In appified IoT systems, the rule extractor
comprises a code analysis component to extract rule seman-
tics from apps and a configuration collection component to
collect rule-device binding information. The rule semantics
and rule-device bindings constitute the complete automation
logic.
• Policy Manager generates and manages data flow policies
used for protecting IoT data. Policy generation, on one hand,
interacts with the rule extractor to generate semantics-based
data-minimization policies; on the other hand, it takes in
user-specified policies from the user interfaces and formats
them into executable-formatted policies. Conflict detection
inspects if a user-specified policy conflicts with existing
data-minimization policies and thus affects home automa-
tion; when conflicts are detected, it reports the conflict to
the user for making decisions. Policy engine interprets and
executes the above policies over the incoming raw data from
IoT devices.
• Data Flow Mediator is a proxy who mediates the commu-
nication between IoT devices and the hub. The mediator,
on behalf of the hub, talks with IoT devices via device-
dependent protocols (e.g., ZigBee, ZWave, WiFi, etc) and
forwards the raw device data to the policy engine for
processing. On the other hand, the mediator creates a virtual
device instance to send the processed data to the hub, on
behalf of each real device. All virtual device instances
use a uniform communication protocol supported by the
target platform (e.g., LAN in SmartThings [27] and MQTT
in openHAB [28]). Besides, the virtual devices receive
device control commands from the hub, which will then
be translated to protocol-specific commands and forwarded
to the corresponding real device. The data mediation is not
transparent to the platform and therefore the platform works
exactly the same way.
V. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present the detailed design and im-
plementation of PFIREWALL. We choose Samsung’s Smart-
Things, one of the most mature and comprehensive smart
1TRIGGER:{
2match (:type).(:subject).(:attribute)
3satisfy (:operator)->(:value)
4[fetch1] (:type).(:subject).(:attribute*)
5[branch] (:operator1)->(:value)
6run (:method)(:parameters)(:delay)
7[else] (:method1)(:parameters1)(:delay1)
8}
9CHECK: [{
10fetch (:type).(:subject).(:attribute)
11satisfy (:operator)->(:value)
12[fetch1] (:type).(:subject).(:attribute*)
13[branch] (:operator)->(:value)
14run (:method)(:parameters)
15[else] (:method1)(:parameters1)
16}, ...]
Listing 1: Context-aware policy format
home platforms, as the underlying platform to describe the
implementation of PFIREWALL. We first describe our policy
generation and management for contextually controlling IoT
data flows. Then, we present how we enforce policies in
existing IoT systems by introducing a data flow mediator. To
show the applicability of PFIREWALL, we also present how
we integrate PFIREWALL with another platform, openHAB,
by adapting the platform-specific components.
A. Data Flow Control Policies
1) Policy Definition and Execution: Home automation is
context-aware: a rule executes a command when it is triggered
by an event and meanwhile the smart home is under the pre-
scribed condition. Note that the event and condition are slightly
different: an event describes a context change (e.g., the motion
sensor’s reading changes from “inactive” to “active”, which
indicating a motion is detected) while a condition indicates
a collection of static statuses (e.g., the motion sensor’s latest
reading is “active”). To precisely filter raw IoT data flows for
data minimization without interfering with the execution of
automation rules, data flows need to be processed contextually.
To this end, we define a context-aware policy format.
Formally, we define a data flow policy as P=(T, C), where
T and C denote the TRIGGER and CHECK section in a policy
as shown in Listing 1. TRIGGER defines the incoming event
that triggers the execution of P and CHECK encapsulates a
list of items, each of which indicates a constraint that must
be satisfied for the policy to indeed perform actions. type
indicates that the event is fired by a device or is a time change,
etc; subject is to identify a specific IoT device (i.e., device
ID); attribute specifies the attribute of a device (which may
have multiple attributes) or the time-related feature (e.g., time
of day, date, timer). type, subject and attribute are to
check if an incoming data matches the event that triggers the
policy in TRIGGER and are to query the smart home status
for constraint checking in CHECK. operator and value
denote a constraint that the incoming event or smart home
status must satisfy for the policy context to be evaluated as
true. A policy action defined in the run fields where method
and parameters define how to process the raw data and
delay controls the timing for reporting the processed data to
the platform. Besides, there are three optional fields marked
with “[]” that form an extended TRIGGER section or a CHECK
item. [fetch1] and [branch] evaluate an extra constraint on
the fetched data; if true action defined in run is executed, and
otherwise action in else will be executed instead.
Policies are executed by a policy engine. The policy engine
listens to all the incoming raw data from the IoT devices and
time-related information if registered. When receiving a new
data item D (a.k.a. an event), the engine uses D to evaluate the
maintained data flow policies one by one. Algorithm 1 shows
the general workflow of how the engine evaluates and executes
a policy P. Specifically, it first checks if D matches the
type, subject, and attribute in TRIGGER, and then
examines if the value of D satisfies the constraint specified by
operator and value. If true, P is triggered and proceeds
to execute. Then the engine evaluates all items specified in
CHECK. Since the data required for evaluating the CHECK
items are not newly captured events but the current smart
home status (e.g., the device working status), the policy engine
fetches the information indexed by type, subject and
attribute from a database DB, which stores the latest at-
tribute values of all connected devices and updates them when
devices report any change. Only when constraints defined in
all CHECK items are satisfied, the policy is finally evaluated
and the actions defined in all run or else fields will be
performed. During the above process, a policy terminates if
there is any event mismatches or constraint violation. Besides,
the policy engine also maintains another database DB∗ to keep
record of the lastest reported data for each device attribute.
Algorithm 1: The algorithm for executing a policy
Input : D← new data item, P← A privacy policy
DB← Newest Device Status Database
DB∗ ← Newest Reported Data Database
Output: Privacy-Aware Data Set DS
1 if match(D.source, P.TRIGGER.(type, subject, attribute)) and
satisfy(D.value, P.TRIGGER.(operator, value)) then
2 foreach checkitem∈P.CHECK do
3 val ← fetch (DB, checkitem.(type, subject, attribute))
4 if !satisfy(val, checkitem.(operator, value)) then
5 return
6 if P.TRIGGER.contains([branch]) then
7 val∗ ←fetch (DB∗, P.TRIGGER.(type, subject, attribute∗))
8 if satisfy(val∗, P.TRIGGER.(operator1,value)) then
9 DS← run P.TRIGGER.(method, paras., delay)
10 else
11 DS← run P.TRIGGER.(method1, paras.1, delay1)
12 else
13 DS← run P.TRIGGER.(method, parameters, delay)
14 foreach checkitem ∈ P.check do
15 if checkitem.contains([branch]) then
16 val∗ ←fetch (DB∗,
checkitem.(type, subject, attribute∗))
17 if satisfy(val∗, checkitem.(operator, value)) then
18 DS← checkitem.(method, paras.)
19 else
20 DS← checkitem.(method1, paras.1)
21 else
22 DS← checkitem.(method, paras.)
2) Policy Generation: PFIREWALL generates two types of
policies: automation-based data-minimization policies (APs)
and user-specified policies (UPs). To achieve data minimiza-
tion, i.e., only report the minimum amount of data that
are necessary for home automation, rules are extracted from
installed automation apps and analyzed to find the minimum
data flows for the rules to execute. UPs are generated from
user interfaces and work with APs simultaneously, which is
an important supplement to customize privacy preferences that
cannot be learned from home automation.
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Fig. 3: The policy derivation from an automation rule.
Automation Rule Extraction
Rule extraction is the first step for AP generation. Automation
rules follow an event-condition-action model and are installed
by installing IoT apps or selecting rule templates on web
or mobile app interfaces. The rule extraction regarding both
methods has been widely studied by state-of-art literature.
Code analysis has been proved to be an effective way to
extract rule semantics from IoT apps by state-of-art work.
For example, by utilizing Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) analysis
on smart apps, [29] identifies requested and used capabilities
in SmartApps, [7], [30] breaks down SmartApps and extracts
rule information, [31], [32], [33] builds Deterministic Finite
Automatons (DFAs) from SmartApps. Symbolic execution is
a more powerful technique to analyze rule semantics from apps
[19], [20]. Text data crawling and natural language processing
(NLP) are used for rule extraction from web pages and mobile
apps [32], [34].
Rather than design another code analyzer, in this paper,
we adapt the solution provided in [19] to implement our rule
extractor since it not only implements a complete symbolic
executor with API modeling but also provides an app-device
binding collection approach. We obtain the source code from
the authors and verify its effectiveness on 86 SmartApps
from SmartThings market apps. The executor works on the
AST representation of a SmartApp; the rule extraction starts
from an event subscription method subscribe() (event that
triggers a rule) and traces in the entry point of the event
handler method. All paths branching at if-else statements
(rule condition) are explored until a sink (rule action) is
spotted; expressions (e.g., value assignment) and APIs (e.g.,
device access methods, device control commmands) along the
paths are modelled2. The combination of control flow analysis
and data flow analysis allow us to extract the rule context
(event and condition) and command (action) from a SmartApp.
The right column of Fig. 3 shows the extracted rule from a
temperature control SmartApp that defines a rule R1 “when
a presence sensor ps1 becomes present , if the reading of a
temperature sensor ts1 is higher than 86◦F , turn on the fan
f1”.
Data-Minimization Policy Generation
2Due to page limits, we refer interested readers to the literature [19] for
more details.
Consider the example ruleR1. By default, the platform contin-
uously receives and stores data streams from devices (presence
sensor, temperature sensor, fan). However, we observe that
these data are not all required for executing R1 in cases:
(1) The presence sensor ps1 does not send any event;
(2) ps1 sends a “not present” event;
(3) The indoor temperature measured by ts1 is lower than
86◦F ;
(4) The fan f1 is “ON”;
(5) ps1 sends a “present” event and the last reported temper-
ature by ts1 is higher than 86◦F .
In cases (1)-(4), there is no need to report any data from
ps1 and ts1 to the platform; in case (5), it is unnecessary
to report temperature data since the temperature value stored
in the platform database satisfies the rule condition checking;
in no cases, the ON/OFF state of f1 is useful for executing
R1. From this example, we can conclude that only sporadic
ones in the data streams of devices are required for home
automation, which motivates us to encode highly-structured
automation rules to data-minimization policies. An example
of generating an AP from R1 is shown in Figure 3. The
TRIGGER of AP is derived from the Event of R1 and
CHECK is derived from the Condition and Action of R1,
respectively. According to the policy definition and execution
algorithm presented in Section V-A1, the derived AP expresses
multi-faceted information for PFIREWALL to process data:
1) Context: when and only when an incomming event of ps1
is “present” and meanwhile the latest received reading of
ts1 is higher than 86◦F and the state of f1 is not “ON”,
some data will be reported, and otherwise, the policy will
be skipped and no data will be reported at all;
2) Event reporting: if the latest reported value of ps1 is
“present”, use the diffKeep() method to process the
current value for reporting, and otherwise, use keep();
3) CHECK data reporting: if the latest reported value of ts1 is
higher than 86◦F , use the block() method to process the
current value of ts1, and otherwise, use randomize(86,
MAX); use block() to process the state data of f1.
Table I shows a summary of all the methods used in the
run and else fields. In the default setting, binary sensors
such as the presence sensor reports binary values alternatively;
thus, SmartThings only fires an event when observing a value
change. Our data flow control breaks the alternate “present”
and “not present” values in the data stream of ps1. Thus,
when the platform receives “present” but finds the last value
is also “present”, it will not issue a “present” event in its
framework and R1 cannot be triggered. Hence, the derived AP
uses diffKeep() rather than keep() to address this issue;
diffKeep() reports “not present” followed by “present”
with a time delay T , which ensures a “present” event is fired.
It is worth mentioning that the selection of T is non-trivial to
guarantee the normal execution of home automation because
it allows time for the platform to update a received data to its
database. Similarly, it is required that SmartThings have up-
dated the temperature value (if necessary) in database before it
issues a “present” event to R1; otherwise, the app will fail the
temperature condition check when triggered by the event3. The
3We manually observed app execution while tuning T and found a value
as small as 100 millisecond without causing failure in 1000 trials.
TABLE I: Summary of methods used in data flow policies
Method Description
keep() Report the original value
block() Do not report
diffKeep() Report a different value and then the original value
randomize(MIN,MAX) Report a random value ∈ (MIN,MAX)
pickOther(CUR,ENUM) Randomly picked a value ( 6=CUR) from set ENUM
TABLE II: Boundary values for randomizing different attributes
Attribute Min Max Unit
Temperature -50 150 ◦F
Illuminance 0 100000 Lux
Humidity 0 100 %
Power 0 1800 Watt
block() discards data without sending it. randomize()
randomizes the float-value attribute data (e.g., temperature).
In the example, the temperature is used to compare with
a threshold (86◦F ), so a random value between 86◦F and
the upper limit of a temperature MAX is sufficient for the
condition checking. MAX/MIN denotes the upper and lower
boundaries of a specific attribute (See Table II). We obtain
such information from SmartThings Capabilities Reference
[35]. Besides, we present how PFIREWALL handles time/timer-
related automation in Appendix B.
User-Specified Policy Generation
We propose an interactive approach for users to specify data
flow control policies. This is motivated by three reasons:
1) users have individual privacy preferences that cannot be
derived from automation rules; for example, users might
prioritize privacy rather than automation functionality for some
device types during a time period or under certain situations;
2) the platform may integrate a third-party service but there
is no rule extractor available to extract semantics from it; 3)
users have rights to control the use of their data. In principle,
(a) (b)
Fig. 4: Screenshots of PFIREWALL mobile app. The app provides an
information tab showing users what data every device type generates
and the corresponding privacy implications, and a policy tab allows
users to define context-aware data control policies.
UPs have higher priority than APs in controlling data.
We develop a mobile app for end-users to specify policies.
As shown in Fig. 4(a), information is displayed to help users
understand what privacy issues each device and its data may
imply. With the templates in Fig. 4(b), users are able to
configure whitelist, blacklist and conditional control policies
during a specified time period or under certain contexts.
Finally, UPs are encoded into the policy format in Listing 1 for
execution. See Appendix E for the user survey we conducted
to evaluate the policy templates.
3) Policy Conflicts: A user is likely to define UPs which
conflict with existing APs and hinder the automation since
UPs are designed for overriding APs. Nevertheless, users need
a warning that shows them what conflicts are imposed and
which automation rules are affected. Therefore, an automated
policy conflict detection is necessary. Two policies P1 and
P2 conflict if the following requirements are satisfied: (1) P1
and P2 are triggered simultaneously; i.e., an event makes both
constraints c1T and c
2
T (defined in TRIGGER fields of P1 and
P2, respectively) hold; (2) both policies are finally executed
i.e., all the constraints c1i and c
2
i in the CHECK fields of both
policies are evaluated true; (3) two policies define different
actions (i.e., data processing methods, parameters, or delays)
for the same data. Formally, let S(C) denote the set of all
possible contexts that satisfy the set of constraints C, and
O(a), E(a) denote the object (i.e., the controlled data) and
effects of a certain action a (defined in both TRIGGER and
CHECK fields). A conflict occurs when the formula holds.

S(c1T ) ∩ S(c2T ) 6= ∅,
S(c11, c
1
2, · · · ) ∩ S(c21, c22, · · · ) 6= ∅,
∃i, j,O(a1i ) = O(a2j ),E(a1i ) 6= E(a2j ).
(1)
We detect policy conflict for each newly submitted UP
against all APs. To calculate the constraint overlapping in the
first two formulas in Equation 1, we encode each constraint
in a policy into a quantifier-free first-order formulas:
(type[.subject[.attribute]])︸ ︷︷ ︸
data source and type
(operator)(value).
Thus, the constraint overlapping is transformed into a con-
straint satisfaction problem which can be solved by a constraint
programming (CP) solver. In our implementation, we use a
JavaScript linear solver javascript-lp-solver [36].
If the constraint satisfaction is solvable, two policies will
be executed simultaneously. We then check whether the two
policies perform different actions (by looking at the methods
and parameters in run and else fields) on the same data
flow; if so, the new UP conflict with an existing AP. The
automation app which the AP was derived from would be
affected and is displayed to users for making decisions.
B. Data Flow Mediation
To enforce data flow policies in a closed-source IoT
system, we introduce a data flow mediator for relaying the
communication between IoT devices and the hub, as shown in
Fig. 5. To this end, the mediator needs to (1) act as a hub to
interact with IoT devices and (2) generate a virtual device to
interact with the original hub on behalf of each real device.
Home Gateway Virtual Device Manager
1. join/leave
2. raw data
IoT Device 1. join/leave2. privacy-aware data 
IoT Hub
Virtual Device 
Instance
1. join/leave
2. raw data 3. command
3. command 3. command
1. create/remove
2. privacy-aware data 3. command
1. join/leave
2. privacy-aware data
3. command
Original Flow PFirewall Flow
Fig. 5: The workflow of the data flow mediator.
1) Connecting IoT Devices: To play the role of a hub,
the mediator needs to handle 3 major interactions with IoT
devices: 1) devices join or leave the hub-leading network; 2)
devices report attribute data to the hub; 3) the hub forwards
commands from the platform to devices. The hub functionality
is provided by many open-source platforms, e.g., openHAB
[37] and Mozilla IoT [21], which allow developers to add
add-ons for integrating various IoT devices using different
communication techniques. Until now, openHAB supports 275
bindings that have been tested to work with hundreds of
commercial IoT devices and Mozilla IoT also have tested
more than 100 mainstream devices. In our implementation,
we adapt the source code of Mozilla IoT to realize connecting
with ZigBee and Z-Wave devices since the two techniques are
widely used by IoT devices; specifically, the mediator is built
on a Raspberry Pi with a Digi XStick USB dongle (ZB mesh
version) and an Aeotec Z-Stick (Gen5) to extend ZigBee and
Z-Wave capabilities, respectively.
C. Connecting the Hub and Platform
To interact with a target platform on behalf of a real
device, the mediator creates a virtual device which could: (1)
talk with the hub with a communication technique supported
by it, and (2) be identified as a compatible device by the
platform framework. Most emerging platforms support various
connectivity protocols for developers to build customized
network devices; for example, SmartThings supports LAN-
and cloud-based device integration [27], openHAB supports
Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol [38],
Mozilla IoT provides REST-based Web Things framekwork
and APIs [39], and Wink allows creating RESTful API devices
[40]. This feature alleviates the workload for interfacing with a
target platform. We implement the mediator to work with two
representative platforms: SmartThings and openHAB. Due to
page limit, we present the openHAB part in Appendix C1.
Interfacing with SmartThings
We choose LAN as the protocol for communicating with
the SmartThings hub since PFIREWALL is designed to be
segregated from a DMZ by a firewall; thus attackers can-
not initiate any connection to PFIREWALL to obtain data.
SmartThings provides a device handler (see Section II)
for abstracting each supported device type; accordingly, we
build a virtual device (VD) type for each device handler
(DH) that originally supports ZigBee or Z-Wave devices,
as shown in Fig. 6. We develop a service manager
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Virtual Device
-MotionSensor
SmartThings Cloud
Service Manager
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Fig. 6: Overview of interfacing with SmartThings.
SmartApp on SmartThings that uses SSDP (Simple Service
Discovery Protocol) to discover VD instances on the LAN.
To be considered as different devices (SmartThings uses IP
and port to uniquely identify a device), each VD instance
is launched on a different port. After discovered a device,
the service manager adds it as a child device. When a
child device is added, SmartThings automatically selects
a DH to abstract it according to the model property of
the child device; thus, we make the model property
of the VD instance, the child device the same as the
name of the target DH that is used to represent the cor-
responding real device. After the initial connection, a VD
instance on the mediator side interacts with a DH instance
on the SmartThings with the UPnP (Universal Plug and Play)
protocol, which uses SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol)
messages. Additionally, we adapting all DHs for ZigBee/Z-
Wave devices available in SmartThings IDE. In each DH,
we add a subscribe() function which accomplishes the
SUBSCRIBE step for UPnP communication; when a DH is
instantiated (which means a VD instance is created and a child
device is added), it uses the IP and port to send a SUBSCRIBE
SOAP message to the VD instance, providing its IP and port
information. Moreover, we change the code in parse and
command-related functions for receiving ZigBee/Z-Wave data
and sending ZigBee/Z-Wave commands respectively, to code
for receving and sending SOAP messages in each DH. Thus,
the VD and DH instances become addressable to each other
and realize a subscribe/publish based UPnP communication to
report data and send commands.
VI. EVALUATION
A. Evaluation Setup
We build two real-world testbeds for evaluating the per-
formance of PFIREWALL: an office with 5 members (T1) and
a two-bedroom apartment with 1 member (T2), as shown in
Fig. 7. In each testbed (T1 and T2), we deployed two parallel
systems (SYS1 and SYS2) by placing two same devices at
each position in Fig. 7; SYS1 and SYS2 have the same device
types, numbers, placement and app configuration, as shown in
Table III, Fig. 7 and Table IV. The only difference is that SYS1
is a standard SmartThings deployment but SYS2 introduces
PFIREWALL. We bind SYS1 and SYS2 in each testbed to two
different SmartThings accounts and run them simultaneously
but independently. We choose SmartThings in the real-world
testbeds because SmartThings provides official apps in its app
store, while openHAB needs users to write automation apps
and provides no market apps. Instead, we perform some micro-
benchmark tests for evaluating openHAB (see Appendix C2).
TABLE III: Devices in the two real-world testbeds
Testbed Device (Abbreviation) Attribute Number
Office
(T1)
SmartThings hub v2 (HUB) – 1
Multipurpose sensor (MU) contact, temperature 1
Motion sensor (MO) motion, temperature 1
Smart outlet (OL) switch, power 2
Smart bulb (SL) switch 1
Smartphone (SP) presence 5
Apartment
(T2)
SmartThings hub v2 (HUB) – 1
Multipurpose sensor (MU) contact, temperature 3
Motion sensor (MO) motion, temperature 2
Smart outlet (OL) switch, power 2
Smart bulb (SL) switch 4
Aeotec MultiSensor (AM) motion, humidity,
illuminance
2
Smartphone (SP) presence 1
MO1
MU1SL1
OL1
OL2
SP1SP2SP3
SP4SP5
(a) The office
MU2
MU3
SL2
SL3
AM2
AM1
OL3
MO2
OL4
SP6
MU4
SL5
SL4MO3
(b) The apartment
Fig. 7: The layout and device placement in the two testbeds.
B. Performance of Data Mediating
To test the correctness of PFIREWALL mediator, we disable
the data filtering in SYS2 of both testbeds, i.e., the medi-
ator simply forwards the IoT data to SmartThings without
executing policies. To capture received data by SmartThings,
we insert log.debug code into the parse methods in all
device handlers for the tested devices, which allows us
to record the event logs per device on SmartThings web IDE.
We observe that there exist duplicate events in the captured
SmartThings event logs, so we remove duplicates before
analyses; consecutive events that have the same modality (the
same device, attribute, value) and very close timestamps (not
longer than 1 second) are regarded as the duplicates. We
run the above setting in SYS2 of both testbeds for 10 days
and compare the data sequence of each device received by
PFIREWALL mediator and SmartThings. Table V shows the
total numbers of received data per device and the number of
inconsistencies in the data sequences. The result shows that
our mediator works effectively and correctly in relaying the
received data to the platform.
C. Performance of Policy System
To test the performance of our policy system, we establish
a comparative experiment by running SYS1 and SYS2 simul-
taneously in both testbeds for another 10 days. We enable
data filtering in SYS2, so SYS2 in this experiment runs the
data-minimizaion policies. Also, we define two extra user-
specified policies: UP1 (DO NOT report MO1.motion data
between 5pm to 10pm) in T1 and UP2 (DO NOT report
MU2.contact data between 8am to 6pm) in T1.
1) Correctness and Reliability: Comparing the received
data sequences is meaningless since data are filtered in SYS2,
so we test the correctness of the execution of SmartApps. To
capture the execution of apps, we manually insert logging code
TABLE IV: SmartApp and device settings for the evaluation environments. O: official app, C: custom app.
Testbed SmartApps (Abbreviation)(Source) Description and Device Bindings
T1
UndeadEarlyWarning (UEW)(O) When door (MU1) is opened, turn on light (SL1).
LightsOffWithNoMotionAndPresence (LON)(O) When no motion (MO1) or presence (SP1∼5) is detected for 5 minutes, turn off light (SL1).
MyAutoCoffee (MAC)(C) When presence (SP1) becomes present, if time is before 12am, turn on coffee machine (OL1).
MyAutoHeater (MAH)(C) When motion (MO1) detected, if temperature (MU1) < 70◦F , turn on heater (OL2).
MyFitnessNotification (MFN)(C) When motion (MO1) is active for longer than 60 minutes, send a message to alert.
StrangerNotification (STN)(C) When door (MU1) is open, if no presence (SP2∼5), send a message.
T2
UndeadEarlyWarning (UEW)(O) When door is opened (MU2), turn on light (SL2).
SmartLights (SML)(O) When motion (MO2) active if illuminance (AM1) < 15 LUX, turn on light (SL3).
TurnOnOnlyIfIArriveAfterSunset (TOO)(O) When presence (SP6) becomes present if between 5-8pm, turn on oven (OL3).
TextMeWhenThere’sMotionAndI’mNotHere (TMW)(O) When motion (MO2) active if not presence (SP6), send a notification.
LetThereBeLight! (LTB)(O) When wardrobe door (MU4) open, turn on light (SL5); when door (MU4) close, turn off light (SL5).
VirtualThermostat (VIT)(O) When motion (MO2) is detected if temperature (MU3) < 68◦F , turn on heater (OL4); when motion (MO2)
inactive for 20 minutes, turn off heater (OL4).
SmartBedroomLight (SBL)(C) When door (MU3) opened, turn on light (SL4); when door (MU3) closed if motion (MO3) inactive for 5
minutes, turn off light (SL4).
NotifyMeWhenSomeoneFaints (NMW)(C) When humidity (AM2) exceeds 85% if motion (AM2) active but motion (MO3) keeps inactive for 30
minutes, send a notification.
TABLE V: Statistics of the data received by PFIREWALL mediator and
that received by SmartThings for the evaluation of data mediating. Due to
page limits, we only present the result of one device for each device type.
Total: the total data volume received by SmartThings cloud and PFIREWALL
mediator, respectively.
Testbed Device Attribute Total Inconsistency
T1
MU1 contact 1960, 1960 0
MU1 temperature 174, 174 0
MO1 motion 2198, 2198 0
MO1 temperature 325, 325 0
OL1 switch 38, 38 0
SL1 switch 24, 24 0
SP1 presence 62, 62 0
T2
AM1 motion 384, 384 0
AM1 humidity 656 , 656 0
AM1 illumance 927, 927 0
TABLE VI: Statistics of SmartApp method call logs. MC: the number of
method calls; INC: the number of inconsistencies; INCA: the number of
inconsistencies after eliminating redundant method calls.
Testbed App Data Control Results
MC in SYS1 MC in SYS2 INC INCA
T1
UEW 971 11 960 0
LON 11 11 0 0
MAC 9 12 3 1
MAH 1059 47 1012 0
MFN 13 11 2 2
STN 5 5 0 0
T2
UEW 26 10 16 3
SML 41 41 0 0
TOO 11 7 4 0
TMW 3 3 0 0
LTB 42 42 0 0
VIT 235 49 186 0
SBL 164 55 109 0
NMW 3 3 0 0
into the installed SmartApps to record the method calls for
controlling devices and sending notifications. We compare the
method call sequences of each app in SYS1 and SYS2 and
calculate the number of inconsistencies. We summarize the
result in Table VI. We figure that the INC values of some
apps are large. This is because SmartThings apps do not check
a device’s current status before sending it a command and thus
redundant method calls are made while PFIREWALL in design
disables redundant automation commands to reduce reporting
data. For instance, the app UEW calls the light turn-on method
every time the door (MU1) is opened, no matter the light is “on”
or “off”; however, the redundant method calls are avoided by
our data flow policies if the light’s status is already “on”. Thus,
inconsistencies are detected in some apps. To eliminate the im-
pact of redundant automation on the evaluation of automation
accuracy, we capture and remove the redundant method calls
from method call sequences in SYS1 by analyzing app and
device logs; specifically, if a method call’s effect is to change
a device to a state the device is already in, this method call is
identified as redundant and removed from the sequence. We
recalculate the inconsistencies, denoted as INCA. As show
in Table VI, INCA in most apps are 0 except in four apps:
MAC, MFN in T1 and UEW in T2. We manually analyze the
causes of these inconsistencies by examining the device event
and method call logs. we find that the event log of SP1
in SYS2 has one more “present” than that of SYS1. This
is because SmartThings detects presence by monitoring the
distance of a smartphone (GPS data) from the in-home hub
while PFIREWALL scans the home WiFi network to examine if
a smartphone enters/leaves; when SP1 moves around, different
presence statuses are detected by the two methods due to
distinct detection ranges, leading to the inconsistency in MAC.
The inconsistencies in MFN and UEW appear because user
specified policies UP1 and UP2 block MO1.motion and
MU2.contact data during certain periods, respectively. We
verify that the 2 inconsistencies in MFN occur during 5pm-
10pm and the 3 inconsistencies in UEW occur during 8am-6pm.
We also observe that no MO1.motion or MU2.contact
data are received by SmartThings in SYS2 during the specified
periods in UP1 and UP2, respectively. The above result shows
the correctness of our policy-based data flow control in enforc-
ing user-specified policies and in preserving home automation
functionalities by generating data-minimization policies.
2) Latency: We show the efficiency of PFIREWALL by test-
ing the introduced automation latency (mediating delay plus
policy execution delay). We obtain the result by computing the
timestamp difference of the same command in both command
sequences (SYS1 and SYS2). We exclude the outliers from
our calculation where the command in SYS1 is even issued
after SYS2 to reduce the influence of network delay and
the cloud response latency on the result. We calculate the
automation latency for each SmartApp in both testbeds and
show the result in Figure 8. The automation latency ranges
from 124.7 to 486.4 millisecond. An averaged latency of 210.6
millisecond is a tradeoff for using PFIREWALL to mitigate
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Fig. 8: Automation latency introduced by PFIREWALL. The boxes
show the maximum, quartile, averaged and minimum values of the
majority latencies per app. The blue squares are some outliers.
TABLE VII: Comparison of reported data volume per device before and
after the deployment of PFIREWALL. V OL: volume of reported data in SYS1
and SYS2, respectively; RR: data reduction rate. We present the result for
partial devices. See Appendix D for the result of all deployed devices.
Dev Attr V OL RR Attr V OL RR
MU1 contact 1924, 22 0.98 temperature 142, 6 0.96
MO1 motion 2266, 47 0.98 temperature 307, 0 1
OL1 switch 29, 0 1
SL1 switch 22, 0 1
SP1 presence 34, 24 0.29
MU2 contact 52, 24 0.54 temperature 118, 0 1
MO2 motion 364, 68 0.81 temperature 173, 0 1
OL3 switch 44, 0 1
SL2 switch 60, 0 1
AM1 motion 364, 0 1
AM1 illuminance 1039, 1 0.99 humidity 668, 0 1
SP6 presence 28, 12 0.57
privacy leakage, although the latency is completely acceptable
for most automation apps.
3) Reduction of Data Leakage: To show the effectiveness
of data filtering, we compare the data volume reported by each
device in the SYS1 and SYS2 of both testbeds. As show in
Table VII, PFIREWALL blocks 96.87% IoT data on averaged.
More than 99% of float-value sensor readings and device
states (i.e., ON/OFF states of coffee machines, setpoints of
thermostats, locked/unlocked states of smart locks, etc.); thus,
PFIREWALL prevents the smart home platforms and potential
attackers from learning the private information of smart homes
and homeowners based on float-value sensors and household
appliances. PFIREWALL also reduces the reporting of binary-
value sensor attributes (contact, motion, presence) to distinct
extents, according to the specific automation app semantics
and app-device bindings. The relative reduction rate RR of
binary-value attributes are smaller than float-value attributes
in general, since binary attributes are used for triggering the
execution of automation apps in most cases and hence cannot
be totally blocked.
4) Privacy Gain: To show how privacy preservation is
achieved by the reducing data leakage, we compare the po-
tential privacy leakage under several inference attacks with
and without PFIREWALL.
Office members and events profiling. By analyzing the
presence sensor (SP1∼5) data in the research lab testbed (T1),
the working hours of 5 members (person 1∼5) each of whom
carries a presence sensor could be learned, based on their
entering and leaving time, as shown in Fig. 9(a). In addition
to monitoring user presence in real time, the attacker could
also learn the personal working preferences and group events.
For example, person 1 may leave for classes each Tuesday
and Wednesday; person 3 works less hours than person 1 and
2 during weekdays but shows up more on weekends; person
4 has a more regular routine through the weekdays; person
5 works less hours (4 or so) every day and the hours tend
to be in the afternoon; moreover, the members may leave
for a group meeting on Friday morning. When PFIREWALL
is deployed, most presence data are filtered since only the
“present” events before 12am from SP1 are required to turn
on coffee machine outlet (see app MAC). The presence sensor
data of the other persons are never sent because their values
are kept “not present” in the platform database and only “not
present” events from SP1 are sent in order for the app LON
to pass its condition checking. when the last person leaves.
which hides the real leaving time of person 1.. Therefore, an
attacker could only learn when person 1 arrives the lab room
correctly (see Fig. 9(b)).
Bathroom usage monitoring. By accessing the motion and
humidity data of the Aeotec Multisensor (AM2) in the apart-
ment testbed (T2), an attacker can learn the bathroom usage
habits. As depicted in Fig. 10(a), the attacker simply combines
each “active” with the next “inactive” event to obtain the start
and end time of a bathroom usage. Moreover, the attacker
can also use the humidity data (see Fig. 10(c)) as additional
information to help recognize “having shower” activities in the
bathroom. In the experiment, the attacker identifies 4 “having
shower” activities by comparing the humidity values with a
common sense threshold (i.e., 85%). When PFIREWALL is
applied, the humidity data is rarely sent (for executing the
anomaly activity detection app NMW) and motion “active”
(AM2) is reported only once to keep the motion value “active”
in the platform database. As shown in Fig. 10(b) and 10(d),
the humidity and motion data are respectively sent only once
in our one-week experiment, preventing the attacker from
monitoring and learning the bathroom usage habits.
Appliance monitoring. Non-intrusive load monitoring
(NILM) techniques can infer appliance events based on
electricity data, causing privacy concerns [41], [42]. We set
up another experiment to learn how attackers are prevented
from inferring appliance working status and user activities
when power data are protected. We connect a microwave, a
kettle and a stove to a smart outlet and install an automation
app that turns off the outlet when a user leaves home to avoid
fire accidents. Although the app only needs a presence sensor
data to operate, the outlet also measures real time power data
and reports it to outside. To study the incurred privacy risk, we
collect the reported raw power data (see Fig. 11(a)) for 3 days
and perform inference attacks. The attack process includes
data pre-processing, clustering and mapping (Fig. 11(b)-
11(d)). The inference result achieves 95.7% precision and
92% recall in identifying appliance activities when compared
with the manually collected ground truth. When PFIREWALL
operates, all power data are preserved for running this app
and hence no user privacy could be inferred from power data.
VII. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
Can PFIREWALL perform home automation and thus get
rid of the cloud? Note that PFIREWALL has access to all
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Fig. 9: Inferred user working hours within 10 days with and without
data flow control in testbed T1. For simplicity of illustration, we
round all presence data timestamps to the nearest hours.
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Fig. 10: 1-week motion and humidity data in the bathroom of testbed
T2 received by the platform with and without data flow control. For
an clearer display, motion data that indicate shorter than 3-minute
bathroom activities are omitted in (a).
device data and rule semantics from IoT apps. Theoretically,
PFIREWALL is capable of running a rule engine to execute
the extracted semantics; thus, no data is sent to the cloud at
all. However, we did not employ this design due to practical
considerations. (1) The kick-cloud-out strategy may cause
ethical or legal concerns which our research team cannot
tackle. The SmartThings cloud can easily verify whether it is
talking with a real SmartThings hub, and cut all the services
if not. It means that, while PFIREWALL may provide home
automation, all other cloud-based services (messaging, storage,
and remote management) will be lost. (2) Huge engineering
efforts are needed to implement an equivalent rule engine
that supports the same programming framework and APIs
and maintain them in a long run. Therefore, we strategically
segregate the data flow control policy engine and the rule
engine; PFIREWALL only deals with data filtering.
User efforts. In PFIREWALL, users pair IoT devices with
the mediator on PFIREWALL web interfaces and add the
virtual device instances to SmartThings with its companion
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Fig. 11: Appliance usage inference over 3-day power data without
data flow control.
mobile app; thus, users operation for connecting devices is
doubled. We design SmartThings-alike pairing interfaces on
the PFIREWALL side, which makes pairing on both sides
similar and reduces potential confusions. Moreover, we use the
browser automation framework Selenium to develop a Python
script, which periodically checks the new SmartApps and de-
vices, and installs corresponding instrumented SmartApps (for
rule extraction) and custom device handlers (for PFIREWALL
mediation), respectively. Users only provide their SmartThings
accounts to the script and no other operations are required.
Generality. Although our implementation targets SmartThings
and openHAB, the presented approach can be potentially
adapted to other ecosystems. As discussed in Section V-B,
it is complete practical to realize a man-in-the-middle medi-
ator in most systems. On one hand, the mediator could be
extended to work with as various IoT devices as an open-
source platform; on the other, the mediator could interfacing
with many platforms via a connectivity technique provided by
these platforms for creating and integrating software services
and hardware devices as “things”. Moreover, approaches for
extracting automation rules from IoT apps [31], [7], [32], [20],
[19] and mobile/web interfaces [32], [34], [43] have been
broadly studied. We envision that tools are developed by the
community for extracting rule semantics from more platforms
such that the data-minimization policies can be generated.
VIII. RELATED WORK
A. Privacy in Smart Home Platforms
Besides security, privacy is also an important research topic
in smart home ecosystems. Zheng et al. [2] studied smart
home owners’ perceptions of privacy risks and actions taken
to protect their privacy; the study found that users are unaware
of privacy risks from inference algorithms operating on data
from their IoT devices, and they expect device manufacturers
to protect their privacy though it is not the case. Celik et al.
[4] provided a tool for tracking the sensitive data flows in
programming frameworks and identified 138 out of 230 apps
in SmartThings transmit at least one kind of sensitive data over
platform-provided APIs, which means malicious apps have
the capability to steal user data collected by the platform.
Literature [18] and [31] also present app-level attacks that
can brench user privacy. Closest to our work, FlowFence [6]
enforced a data flow control mechanism for sensitive data
protection. However, FlowFence protects sensitive data from
unauthorized apps rather than the platform, so sensitive data
protection still fails to other attacks; FlowFence requires the
cooperation from the platforms and app developers to operate.
B. In-hub Security and Privacy Enforcement
Many in-hub schemes are proposed to enforce security and
privacy schemes in the IoT domain. Simpson et al. design a in-
hub security manager built atop the smart home hub to patch
vulnerable IoT devices and strengthen authentication. The se-
curity manager is deployed in a open-source system HomeOS.
FACT [44] and HanGuard [45] enforce access controls in the
middle by implementing controllers on an open-source hub
and a programmable WiFi router, respectively. By comparison,
these schemes rely on a programmable hub (gateway, router)
that can indeed intercept control the communication between
home area network and the Internet. However, in cloud-
based smart home platforms like SmartThings, communica-
tions between the commercial hub and the backend cloud
are encrypted [46] and hence the router can neither decrypt
nor modify the packets on demand. PFIREWALL controls
the communication between IoT devices and the hub in a
unified, backward-compatible way, regardless of the specific
communication protocol employed by the hub and cloud.
IX. CONCLUSION
We presented PFIREWALL, a semantics-aware customiz-
able data flow control system for smart homes, which filters
data generated by IoT devices. PFIREWALL can automatically
generate application-dependent policies based on installed au-
tomation apps to block unnecessary data flows and only report
the minimum amount of data required for home automation.
Furthermore, PFIREWALL allows users to customize individual
policies according to their own privacy preferences.
We overcame many challenges and designed an elegant
man-in-the-middle proxy based system, which enforces these
policies without modifying the platform or IoT devices. We
implemented a prototype of PFIREWALL and evaluated it in
two real-world testbeds. The evaluation results demonstrated
that PFIREWALL can effectively and efficiently reduce sensi-
tive data leakage without interfering with home automation.
It heavily impairs an attacker’s ability to monitor and infer
user privacy-sensitive behaviors. In addition to smart homes,
the system can also significantly enhance privacy protection
in many other environments, such as smart factories and
offices, that leverage smart platforms for IoT device interaction
automation and other platform-provided services.
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APPENDIX
A. Investigation on Popular Smart Home Platforms
We study the privacy policies and practices on 7 popular
cloud-based smart home platforms and 3 platforms that use
other architectures for comparison. A brief summary is shown
in Table VIII. “Easy to access?” shows if a privacy policy
is explicitly displayed or prompted during the installation
of the platform’s products (especially apps). “Collect device
data?” shows whether a privacy policy claims that the platform
accesses users’ devices during the services. “Expose data to
partners?”, “Restrict data use on 3rd parties?” and “Privacy
techniques” show whether the platform claims to share users’
data with third parties, whether it claims to restrict how third
parties can legally use these data and what techniques it
employs to protect user privacy during data sharing. “Collect
personal info.?” shows whether a platform collects personally
identifiable information from users during the registration
process. “Access device data?” shows if the platform ac-
cesses device data while providing services. “Expose data
to partners?” shows whether the platform provides device
data to third-parties, including integrated third-party services.
“Access control before hub?” and “User controllable?” indicate
whether any access control mechanism is enforced before the
platform’s hub accesses device data and whether users can
control the access between devices and the platform’s hub.
Some privacy policies fail to increase user perceptions
of sensitive data collection since they fail to 1) be easily
accessible, or 2) use jargon-free words, or 3) claim sensitive
data collection explicitly. Some policies, although claim shar-
ing data with third-parties, do not claim any data protection
techniques or any restriction policies to the third-parties. On
the other hand, we found the fact that most of the studied
platforms request personal-identifiable information from dur-
ing registration, access sensitive data from IoT devices, and
share data with business partners. However, most platforms do
not have mechanisms to minimize the data access from users
and do not provide interfaces to users for fine-grained controls
on their sensitive data. Users are only capable of choosing
whether to agree with the privacy policy. Once a device is
connected to the platform, they cannot further decide how their
deivces report data to the platforms.
B. Time/Timer-related Automation
PFIREWALL also deals with time-related automations. For
instance, if a rule is defined as “when the door is opened if
time is after 18:00, turn on TV”, the derived policy needs to
fetch system time for condition checking. When it comes to a
timer-related automation, e.g., “when motion sensor becomes
inactive for 5 minutes, turn off the light”, multiple policies
are bundled to operate by calling the methods for starting,
stopping and firing a timer. Fig. 13 illustrates the workflow of
how PFIREWALL handles this example.
C. Interfacing with openHAB
1) Implementation: We use the supported MQTT to inter-
face with openHAB because it is a general connectivity proto-
col, allowing for virtualizing any device types with flexibility.
Fig. 14 shows the high-level architecture of the integration.
openHAB provides an embedded MQTT broker, so our work
is to realize each virtual device (VD) as a MQTT client and
create a Generic MQTT thing (supported by MQTT binding) in
openHAB for the real device represented by the VD. A thing in
openHAB has channels (equivalent to the concept “attribute”
in SmartThings, e.g., motion, temperature, etc.) and each
channel can be linked to an item (used for displaying values
received by the linked channel and used as an interface for
automation rules to interact with the real device). In openHAB,
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 12: The PFirewall Survey mobile app used in the user survey.
TABLE VIII: A summary of privacy policies and facts in some well-known platforms. AGG: aggregation; ANO: anonymization.
Platform Privacy Policy FactsEasy to
access?
Collect
device data?
Expose data
to partners?
Restrict data use
on 3rd parties?
Privacy
techniques
Collect
personal info.?
Access
device data?
Expose data
to partners?
Access control
before hub?
User
controllable?
Wink " " " % AGG " " " % %
Iris " " " % % " " " % %
Vera " " " " AGG, ANO " " " % %
Lutron " % " % % " " " % %
Thingsee " " " " AGG, ANO " " " % %
SmartThings % " " " AGG, ANO " " " % %
EVRYTHNG % % % % % " " " % %
openHAB % % % % % " " " % %
Mozilla IoT % % % % % " " % % %
Apple HomeKit " % % % % " " % % %
Timer
(id1, duration)
Active
Inactive
Motion Sensor
StartTimer(id1)
StopTimer(id)
addCallback(id1, action1)
if duration > 5min, 
fireTimer(id1)
action1
...
Fig. 13: The workflow of how PFIREWALL handles a timer-related
rule example. The methods are show in Table IX. action1 is defined to
report “inactive” to the platform with method keep and zero delay.
Each timer maintains a list of actions which will be called when the
timer’s duration satisfies a certain constraint.
each MQTT thing channel can be configured as a MQTT
client. By subscribing to the same MQTT topic (essentially
a path-alike string), MQTT clients can publish/receive data
to/from the topic.
When a new device is added to PFIREWALL, a VD
instance is created. If the real device is a sensor (e.g.,
TABLE IX: Methods for dealing with timer-related automation
Method Description
startTimer(id) Create or reset a timer with identity id
stopTimer(id) Stop and reset a timer with identity id
fireTimer(id) Fire a timer id and execute actions in its callbacks
addCallback(id,act) Add an action act to the callbacks of timer id
motion sensor in Fig. 14), the VD instance subscribes
to a topic data/{device id}/{attribute} (e.g.,
data/12345/motion) for publishing data, where device id
is generated randomly by PFIREWALL; if the real device is an
actuator (e.g., smart outlet), the VD instance subscribes to a
topic data/{device id}/{attribute} for publishing
data and a topic cmd/{device id}/{attribute} for
receiving commands. The MQTT bining in openHAB does
not provide a device discovery function. To automatically add
a thing and its channel in openHab, there are two choices:
operating on the web interfaces or adding a configuration
file in the openhab/conf/things/ directory. We choose
Virtual Device 
Manager
Virtual Device
-SmartOutlet
Virtual Device
-MotionSensor
openHAB
MQTT Embedded Broker
SmartOutlet
T1: data/id_outlet/switch
PFirewall
item_s
Motion Sensor
motionswitch
item_m
T3: data/id_motion/motion
T2: cmd/id_outlet/switch
MQTT topics
T1 T2 T3 T4
Thing
Channel
Item
T1 T2 T3 T4
Fig. 14: Overview of how the mediator interfacing with openHAB.
TABLE X: Comparison of reported data volume per device before and after
the deployment of PFIREWALL. V OL: volume of reported data in SYS1 and
SYS2, respectively; RR: relative reduction rate. We present the result for each
device type. See Appendix D for the complete result of all deployed devices.
Dev Attr V OL RR Attr V OL RR
MU1 contact 1924, 22 0.98 temperature 142, 6 0.96
MO1 motion 2266, 47 0.98 temperature 307, 0 1
OL1 switch 29, 0 1
OL2 switch 19, 0 1
SL1 switch 22, 0 1
SP1 presence 34, 24 0.29
SP2 presence 36, 1 0.97
SP3 presence 30, 1 0.96
SP4 presence 28, 1 0.96
SP5 presence 26, 1 0.96
MU2 contact 52, 24 0.54 temperature 118, 0 1
MU3 contact 268, 58 0.78 temperature 131, 8 0.94
MU4 contact 42, 42 0 temperature 109, 0 1
MO2 motion 364, 68 0.81 temperature 173, 0 1
MO3 motion 564, 21 0.96 temperature 157, 0 1
OL3 switch 44, 0 1
OL4 switch 49, 0 1
SL2 switch 60, 0 1
SL3 switch 68, 0 1
SL4 switch 70, 0 1
SL5 switch 42, 0 1
AM1 motion 364, 0 1
AM1 illuminance 1039, 1 0.99 humidity 668, 0 1
AM2 motion 462, 0 1
AM2 illuminance 1384, 0 1 humidity 893, 1 0.99
SP6 presence 28, 12 0.57
the latter approach to automate the process. By populating a
string template with the same device id, attribute and topic
information as the VD instance, PFIREWALL creates a MQTT
thing by adding a thing file to the openHAB directory through
a FTP service. Thus, the created MQTT thing can receive data
from or send commands to the VD by subscribing to the same
topics.
2) Evaluation: openHAB allows users to write automation
apps with a domain specific language (DSL), which is adapted
from Xbase [47]. However, openHAB does not provide official
apps for installation. To test our openHAB integration, we
develop 13 apps implementing the same rule semantics to work
with the same devices, as shown in Table IV. We manually
operate the real devices to trigger each rule for 20 times and
find all apps are executed correctly.
D. Complete Evaluation Result of Data Volume Reduction
Due to page limits, we only present the result of one
device for each device type in Table VII in Section VI-C3.
Table X shows the complete list of all deployed devices in
both testbeds.
E. User Study
1) Setup: We conduct a user survey to study users’ at-
titude and abilities towards defining customized data flow
control policies with our policy templates (Section V-A2). We
recruit 20 adult participants who are knowledgeable about
the concepts “home automation”, “smart home” or “IoT”
from our institutions. Participants completed the trial tasks
of our “PFirewall Survey” app in our lab using smartphones
we provided and after that answered several questions (see
Section E3).
We asked the participants to get familiar with a smart home
setting where 10 automation rules (Fig. 12(b)) are configured
to work with 15 devices (Fig. 12(a)). The app provides a page
(Fig. 12(c)) to illustrate the architecture of the system and the
potential risks of data leakage; we did not explain the content
and ask questions about this page to avoid influencing the
understanding of end-users by factors other than the interface
itself. Besides, the app also provides an interface showing the
list of 15 devices; when a device is selected, the app switches
to a device detail page (e.g., Fig. 12(d)) showing what data
the device generates and what privacy risks are imposed if
the data are leaked. In addition, policy templates (as shown in
Fig. 4(b)) were provided for participants to define their own
policies. After a 30-minute trial, participants were asked to
answer questions.
2) Results: All 20 participants cared about their data
privacy and thought it useful to define their own data flow
policies for protecting privacy. However, 2 participants thought
they would not spend time in defining policies even if an app
is available. We collect the number of participants who had
privacy concerns on each listed device. Cameras and smart
speakers were the top two devices whose data are considered
sensitive by the participants (19 and 16, respectively); half or
more participants had concerns on the status data of smart
locks, doors and windows (11, 13, 10, respectively); Each of
humidity sensors, heaters, lights, powers and coffee makers is
concerned by less than 3 participants. Except the listed devices,
the participants also cared about the data privacy of smart TV,
smart window blinds, smart outlet.
Regarding the usability of our policy templates, 8 par-
ticipants thought the templates are “very easy” to use and
12 participants thought them “easy” to use. 3 participants
found that they cannot specify policies to control data by
specifying multiple conditions with the templates, for example,
the combination of an event and a specified time period.
According to the feedback, we address this issue by allowing
users to select another condition after a condition has been
specified.
Overall, participants concern data privacy and hold a pos-
itive attitude in defining own policies with our templates. The
result also shows that participants may overlook the privacy
risks of some devices like humidity sensor and powers, which
we have discussed in Section VI-C4. Hence, data-minimization
policies and user-specified policies could work together to
achieve better privacy protection.
3) Questions in the user study:
1) Do you care about your data privacy if you use a smart
home system?
A. Yes
B. No
2) List the device(s) (from the given device list in our “PFire-
wall Survey” app) which you have privacy concerns if the
device data are leaked.
3) Do you think it is useful in general to control your own
data to reduce privacy leakage risks?
A. Yes
B. No
4) Would you spend time defining your own policies to control
data if an app like “PFirewall Survey” is available for you
to do so?
A. Yes
B. No
5) Recall how our app guide you to define your own policies.
Are the provided policy templates easy to understand and
use?
A. Easy
B. Somewhat challenging but still able to use
C. Not usable
6) Do you find any policy that you think useful but the given
templates fail to enable you to do so? If any, please list it.
F. IRB Approval
Our testbeds need to collect data from the testbed
providers, including the 5 office members and 1 apartment
member. Also, our user study involves 20 participants. We
have received the approval from the IRB in the institution
where all the above investigations are performed.
We value the participant privacy during our investigation
processes. The data collected from both testbeds do not contain
personally identifiable information and location data. The
collected data will be transmitted to and stored in the password
protected computer of one of the authors. Computers that store
data have password-protected accounts and will be in a locked
office that has limited access. Only the researchers identified
on this protocol will have access to the data. Survey partic-
ipants are asked to submit their questionnaire anonymously
without revealing any personally identifiable information. The
questionnaire will be stored in the locked office after analyses.
